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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves the question of when a fear of foreign 
prosecution implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege after 
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Balsys, 
118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998). Appellants are immunized 
witnesses who have refused to testify before a grand jury, 
claiming that their case falls within a test articulated in 
Balsys requiring Fifth Amendment protection. 
 
On October 29, 1997, a special grand jury was impaneled 
in the District of New Jersey for the purpose of investigating 
possible price-fixing or other anticompetitive agreements 
among manufacturers and distributors in the artificial 
sausage casings industry that may violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1. The appellants in this case are 
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employees of a corporation targeted in this investigation; 
each of the appellants appeared before the grand jury 
pursuant to a subpoena and an immunity order of the 
District Court compelling his testimony. Appellants 
indicated their willingness to answer questions relating to 
certain business dealings within the United States, but they 
refused to answer questions about activities that occurred 
in the United States and related to foreign markets or 
occurred outside the United States, claiming that the 
court's compulsion order and grant of immunity provided 
insufficient protection against foreign prosecution. When 
the government moved to hold appellants in contempt, the 
appellants requested the court to order a hearing at which 
they could question the government regarding contacts with 
foreign governments relating to this investigation. 
 
Appellants argued before the District Court, as they do 
here, that language in the Supreme Court's opinion in 
United States v. Balsys created a test for when a foreign 
prosecution implicates a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
rights, and that this prosecution falls within the"test" of 
Balsys, because it is an instance of cooperative 
international antitrust enforcement.1 They offered evidence 
of a "standing policy" that included selections from 
speeches by Antitrust Division officials that discussed 
increasing "internationalization" of antitrust enforcement, 
"positive comity" initiatives with other countries that result 
in information and evidence sharing, and two prior criminal 
antitrust investigations with the Canadian government. 
They also pointed to substantive criminal penalties in other 
countries for antitrust violations, namely, Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Ireland, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, as further 
evidence of increasing internationalization of antitrust law. 
They also argue that the policy of internationalization also 
included the use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
("MLATs") in obtaining information, and also the use of the 
grand jury in aiding foreign prosecutions, through the 
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The language that all agree is the basis for the "test" is set forth 
infra 
at pages 7-8. It does not lend itself to paraphrasing. 
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In addition, appellants argued to the District Court that 
a joint international prosecution had occurred in their 
cases. They pointed to the following as evidence of that joint 
prosecution: 1) questioning of grand jury witnesses about 
Canadian and German contacts; 2) efforts by the Antitrust 
Division in Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Mexico, France, and other nations, to obtain documents for 
the grand jury investigation; and 3) efforts by the Antitrust 
Division to question Mexican and German nationals. 
Appellants also argued that Canadian authorities had 
contacted one of their counsel, and that this event also 
constituted evidence of a joint prosecution. As a result, 
appellants argued they were facing a "whipsaw" in which 
they could be compelled to produce information in this 
country, but be prosecuted in foreign nations, and that the 
Antitrust Division desired to use the witnesses' testimony 
about foreign effects of their behavior to instigate a foreign 
prosecution based on the grand jury's investigation. 
 
Appellants also asserted that they required a hearing to 
question government witnesses, because they had no way 
of further developing their proof regarding foreign contacts. 
In response to appellants' arguments, the government 
disclosed a set of Schofield affidavits and submitted 
separate in camera Schofield affidavits. The disclosed 
affidavits stated that the compelled testimony was sought 
by the United States "to advance the grand jury's inquiry, 
and not for another purpose" and that testimony was not 
sought for the purpose of delivering that testimony to a 
foreign nation. 
 
The appellants claimed that this government proffer was 
insufficient, because it could be inferred from their evidence 
that the Antitrust Division had already been sharing 
information with foreign authorities for the purpose of 
foreign prosecutions. Based on all of these facts, they 
argued, due process required that the nature and extent of 
the relationships between the United States and the foreign 
countries in this case be explained, and that the evidence 
they had already produced mandated an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
The District Court convened a number of hearings that 
focused on the nature and extent of appellants' asserted 
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Fifth Amendment rights. At the first hearing, the District 
Court addressed several of the substantive legal issues 
raised by appellants and engaged in a waiver colloquy with 
one of them, who would not be able to attend the later 
hearing. In the interim, when another appellant refused to 
testify, the court heard argument on the applicability of 
United States v. Balsys and entered an initial contempt 
order; appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, and the 
court heard further argument, withheld signature on its 
contempt order, and combined the claims and arguments of 
the witnesses for briefing and argument. The court then 
held a final hearing on the import of Balsys to determine 
whether the appellants should be held in contempt, and 
whether the appellants' motion to compel witnesses should 
be granted. In addition to these hearings, the court 
reviewed the disclosed and in camera Schofield affidavits 
and questioned prosecutors and the grand jury foreman in 
camera as to the nature of the dispute. 
 
In its final rulings on the motions, the court credited the 
efforts of appellants, but noted that it had to focus upon 
the "well-defined nature of the proceedings that are before 
the Court at this time. . . . what is the likelihood of 
disclosure of the evidence to one or more foreign 
governments at least to the point of requiring a factual 
inquiry into that subject." In so stating, the court accepted 
the government's pronouncements, including the 
assurances made in its Schofield affidavits to the effect that 
the information to be obtained was only to be used for a 
prosecution within the United States, found that the 
appellants had not raised a genuine issue of material fact 
requiring an evidentiary hearing, and denied appellants' 
motion to compel. Later in the argument, appellants made 
a renewed application for an evidentiary hearing and for 
disclosure of the in camera proceedings and affidavits, 
claiming that disputed issues had presented themselves in 
the course of the government's presentation, and that their 
course of dealings with the government indicated that a 
hearing was necessary. The court denied the hearing 
motion once again, finding that the evidence presented by 
appellants, even if accepted, was "immaterial and 
inadequate." The court also found that the evidence and 
argument of appellants did not undermine the 
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government's representations, even those contained in the 
Schofield affidavits released to counsel, that grand jury 
evidence was being collected in furtherance of a legitimate 
inquiry, and that the material was not going to be released 
to foreign prosecutors. The court also found that the 
circumstances presented "virtually no likelihood of the 
generation of a record which would overcome those 
positions asserted by the government with regard to this 
testimony from these witnesses." The District Court then 
moved on to set forth its reading of the Balsys opinion, and 
it found that Balsys did not provide a basis for appellants' 
claims of Fifth Amendment privilege. The District Court 
held the appellants in contempt, and they now appeal to 
this court. 
 
Appellants now assert: 1) the District Court erred in not 
accepting their assertions of privilege, and 2) the District 
Court erred by determining that an evidentiary hearing was 
not required to determine the merit of their Fifth 
Amendment claims, and in so doing, denied them their due 
process rights. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Our review of the District Court's legal analysis is 
plenary. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 
1997). The District Court's decision to deny additional 
review, beyond that of a Schofield affidavit, is subject to 
abuse of discretion review. See In re Grand Jury, No. 98- 
6145, 1999 WL 150880, at *8-*9 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 1999). 
 
I. Balsys 
 
Appellants recognize that the basis for and scope of their 
Fifth Amendment privilege was the subject of extensive 
discussion in United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218 
(1998), in which the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to foreign prosecutions. In 
Balsys, the appellant, in a resident alien application, had 
claimed that he had served in the Lithuanian army between 
1934 and 1940, and that he had lived in hiding in 
Lithuania between 1940 and 1944. See id. at 2221. He was 
subpoenaed by the Office of Special Investigations of the 
Justice Department as to his wartime activities via an 
administrative subpoena. See id. Balsys refused to testify, 
claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self 
 
                                6 
  
incrimination, because although his answers would not 
subject him to criminal investigation in the United States, 
he faced the prospect that his responses to the potential 
deportation proceeding could subject him to criminal 
prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany. See id. at 
2221-22. As the government had conceded the 
reasonableness of Balsys's "real and substantial fear" of 
prosecution, the Court looked to "whether a criminal 
prosecution by a foreign government not subject to our 
constitutional guarantees presents a `criminal case' for 
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 
2222. After surveying the different historic approaches to 
the privilege in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Balsys 
court concluded that fear of foreign prosecution, without 
more, was not a sufficient basis for the invocation of a Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
See id. at 2234-35. 
 
Appellants argue that certain language in the Balsys 
opinion sets forth a "test" for an exception to the general 
rule, whereby the Fifth Amendment privilege may be 
recognized in connection with fear of foreign prosecution. It 
is true that in Balsys, Justice Souter expounds on 
circumstances under which a claim of privilege may 
nonetheless be permissible in light of likely foreign 
prosecution: 
 
       This is not to say that cooperative conduct between the 
       United States and foreign nations could not develop to 
       a point at which a claim could be made for recognizing 
       fear of foreign prosecution under the Self-Incrimination 
       Clause as traditionally understood. If it could be said 
       that the United States and its allies had enacted 
       substantially similar codes aimed at prosecuting 
       offenses of international character, and if it could be 
       shown that the United States was granting immunity 
       from domestic prosecution for the purpose of obtaining 
       evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors 
       of a crime common to both countries, then an 
       argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment 
       should apply based on fear of foreign prosecution 
       simply because that prosecution was not fairly 
       characterized as distinctly "foreign." The point would 
 
                                7 
  
       be that the prosecution was as much on behalf of the 
       United States as of the prosecuting nation, so that the 
       division of labor between evidence-gatherer and 
       prosecutor made one nation the agent of the other, 
       rendering fear of foreign prosecution tantamount to 
       fear of a criminal case brought by the Government 
       itself. 
 
       Whether such an argument should be sustained may 
       be left at the least for another day, since its premises 
       do not fit this case. It is true that Balsys has shown 
       that the United States has assumed an interest in 
       foreign prosecution, as demonstrated by OSI's mandate 
       and American treaty agreements requiring the 
       Government to give to Lithuania and Israel any 
       evidence provided by Balsys. But this interest does not 
       rise to the level of cooperative prosecution. There is no 
       system of complementary substantive offenses at issue 
       here, and the mere support of one nation for the 
       prosecutorial efforts of another does not transform the 
       prosecution of the one into the prosecution of the 
       other. . . . In this case there is no basis for concluding 
       that the privilege will lose its meaning without a rule 
       precluding compelled testimony when there is a real 
       and substantial risk that such testimony will be used 
       in a criminal prosecution abroad. 
 
       118 S. Ct. at 2235-26. 
 
Appellants claim that this language in Balsys sets forth 
a test for determining whether an individual may claim a 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based 
on fear of foreign prosecution, and they articulate the test 
in their brief as follows: 1) the witness's fear of foreign 
prosecution is reasonable; 2) the fear is based on a foreign 
criminal statute substantively similar to United States law; 
and 3) the testimony is being taken with a purpose that it 
will be shared with a foreign government. Br. at 34. 
 
Despite appellants' arguments, we remain unconvinced 
that Balsys necessarily establishes a "test," let alone the 
test they urge. Nor do we view the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements as arguably justifying the privilege here 
given the facts appellants have adduced. First of all, the 
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language in Balsys is conditional rather than prescriptive 
(i.e., "could be said," "could be argued") and sets forth a 
hypothetical situation reserved "for another day," rather 
than a set of rules which a court can readily apply to 
determine whether an investigation is such that the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment should apply. 
Moreover, despite appellants' arguments, we alsofind that 
even were we to seize upon the generalized statements in 
Balsys as a rule, we disagree not only with their 
characterization of the showing it would require but also 
with their contention that their allegations are sufficient to 
bring Balsys into play. They assert the existence of a broad- 
based policy of international prosecution and spirit of 
cooperation that reflects an ongoing and established policy 
of "joint internationalization" of antitrust enforcement by 
the Justice Department that satisfies the Balsys "test." 
However, even when we employ Justice Souter's explication 
in Balsys as our guide, we conclude that instances of 
contacts with overseas nationals, or requests for documents 
in foreign countries, in this case, even when combined with 
the selections of the speeches cited by appellants, are not 
sufficient to demonstrate a "joint prosecution" in the 
meaning contemplated by Balsys. 
 
Balsys recognizes that a Fifth Amendment right may 
possibly exist in a situation in which the prosecutorial 
actions at issue essentially transform foreign efforts into a 
domestic prosecution, so that the protections might apply. 
See 118 S. Ct. at 2230-35. In Balsys, the United States had 
undertaken an interest in the particular kinds of foreign 
prosecution to which Balsys was subject through treaty 
agreements and investigative efforts. See id. at 2235-36. 
For example, an agreement between the United States and 
Lithuania provided for cooperation in prosecution of war 
crimes, mutual legal assistance concerning the prosecution 
of persons suspected of having committed war crimes, and 
assistance in locating witnesses and making available 
witnesses. See id. at n.19. Moreover, in Balsys, the Office 
of Special Investigation was mandated to act as a liaison 
with foreign prosecution offices and to use resources for 
investigations, guidance, information, and analysis, and to 
direct and coordinate prosecutions. See id. at n.18. Yet, the 
Court found that this was not sufficient to create a 
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"cooperative prosecution," as there was "no system of 
complementary substantive offenses at issue here, and 
mere support of one nation for the prosecutorial efforts of 
another does not transform the prosecution of the one into 
the prosecution of the other." 118 S. Ct. at 2235-36. 
Appellants have pointed to questioning of witnesses about 
foreign contacts, efforts to collect documents in other 
nations, and attempts to question Mexican and German 
nationals, and the existence of criminal antitrust penalties 
in other countries as evidence of a "cooperative 
prosecution." However, we see the matter differently. The 
fact that a few instances of evidence gathering have 
occurred in other countries does not create an inferential 
leap that appellants' fear of foreign prosecution is 
"tantamount to fear of a criminal case brought by the 
Government itself." Id. at 2236. In addition, the fact that 
other nations have enacted criminal antitrust laws does not 
dictate a conclusion that nations are acting in concert 
through a system of complementary substantive offenses, 
particularly where a number of the nations in which 
appellants claim they face prosecution in fact do not 
criminalize price fixing, have never had a successful 
criminal antitrust investigation or have never utilized the 
criminal antitrust provisions, or enforce antitrust violations 
through administrative proceedings. The authorities that 
appellants cite, either in their own particular case or in 
terms of trends in Antitrust Division policies, may indicate 
that such a case might present itself to us at some point in 
the future, but we view appellants' argument as urging a 
"what if " scenario rather than a true case of an ongoing or 
imminent international "cooperative prosecution" that 
would warrant our viewing foreign activity as part of a 
domestic prosecution. 
 
II. Flanagan 
 
Although appellants rely heavily on Balsys as supporting 
their position, the government argues that we cannot let 
the novel issue presented by Balsys overshadow the need 
for appellants to satisfy the threshold question conceded by 
the government in Balsys: whether a witness faces a real 
and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. See 118 S. Ct. 
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at 2221; see also United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 
124-26 (2d Cir. 1997), reversed, 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998). We 
will address this issue because we agree that this is an 
essential element that was ultimately neither conceded (as 
in Balsys) nor met in this case, and because the District 
Court's discussion of this issue reflected an ambivalence as 
to its meaning. The District Court first found that it was 
not necessary to rule on the question of the 
"reasonableness" of the fear of foreign prosecution in the 
course of its ruling denying an evidentiary hearing to 
appellants, but then noted that it might revisit the issue as 
it addressed the merits of the contempt motion. The District 
Court then made the following statement when appellants' 
counsel asked whether he should address the question of 
the "reasonableness" of their fear of foreign prosecution: 
 
       Well, I think, frankly, the prospect of foreign 
       prosecution remains uncertain. On the other hand, I 
       realize that we're dealing with lay people who are 
       businessmen, and if it is a question of essentially 
       determining whether any of them objectively . . . has a 
       reasonable fear foreign prosecution might ensue, then 
       such an apprehension would be understandable. 
 
Appellants claim that these statements constitute afinding 
by the District Court that a "reasonable" fear of prosecution 
exists under their version of the Balsys "test." However, we 
note first that this language is somewhat vague and 
conditional, and does not necessarily constitute afinding. 
However, even if we construe this statement as afinding by 
the District Court, we find that it does not properly address 
and analyze the question of "real and substantial fear of 
prosecution" within the meaning of Flanagan, let alone 
Balsys. 
 
The standard for real and substantial fear of foreign 
prosecution is set forth in the Second Circuit's decision of 
In re Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982), and has been 
adopted by this court.2 See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other Courts of Appeal have found that the protections of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 6(e) are sufficient in and of themselves to protect against 
foreign 
prosecution, and that no further inquiry is necessary. See In re Grand 
Jury (Nigro), 705 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 1982); In re Baird, 668 
F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 
                                11 
  
Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1064-66 (3d Cir. 1988). 
The Flanagan test involves the following factors: 1) whether 
there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of a 
witness; 2) what foreign charges could be filed against that 
witness; 3) whether prosecution would be initiated or 
furthered by testimony; 4) whether any such charges would 
entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have an individual 
extradited from the United States; and 5) whether there is 
a likelihood that any testimony given here would be 
disclosed to the foreign government. 691 F.2d at 121. The 
Flanagan court also noted that the apprehension "must be 
a real and reasonable one, based on objective facts as 
distinguished from his subjective speculation." 691 F.2d at 
121. This threshold showing must be made, because the 
Fifth Amendment "privilege protects against real dangers, 
not remote and speculative possibilities." Zicarelli v. New 
Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 
n.2 (1972). Courts have construed these factors narrowly 
and have rarely found that real and substantial danger of 
foreign prosecution exists. See United States v. Gecas, 120 
F.3d 1419, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 2365 (1998). 
 
Appellants have not satisfactorily argued, let alone 
shown, that they face a real and substantial fear of 
prosecution within the meaning of the Flanagan test. First, 
although appellants claim that joint investigative efforts in 
Canada, Germany, and England demonstrate the requisite 
existing or prospective prosecution, the cases that found 
that a witness faced a pending or prospective prosecution 
within the meaning of Flanagan involved a more substantial 
nexus and a heightened likelihood of actual prosecution 
that is lacking in the instant case. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 
1425-26 (potential war crimes prosecution as a result of 
imminent expulsion from United States created real and 
substantial risk of foreign prosecution); United States v. 
Sealed, 794 F.2d 920, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1986) (existing 
prosecution and possibility of extradition created a real and 
substantial fear of prosecution); Moses v. Allard, 779 F. 
Supp. 857, 863-69 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (criminal investigation 
pending in Switzerland, nexus existed between information 
requested in proceeding and pending prosecution, and 
witness faced possibility of extradition, so real and 
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substantial fear of prosecution); Mishima v. United States, 
507 F. Supp. 131, 132-33 (D. Alaska 1981) (where conduct 
was criminalized under Japanese law, and cases had been 
referred to a Japanese prosecutor, witnesses had 
demonstrated real and substantial fear of prosecution, 
whereas witnesses whose cases had not been referred to a 
prosecutor had not demonstrated such a fear); In re 
Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (D. Conn. 1972) 
(questions witness refused to answer concerned events in 
Mexico, potential acts were incriminating under Mexican 
law, and Mexican authorities had expressed an interest in 
the case). 
 
Second, appellants rely upon the existence of criminal 
antitrust laws in other nations. However, these legal codes 
are not as sweeping as appellants claim they are; Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom do not criminalize price- 
fixing, and other countries they list, such as Argentina, 
Chile, and the Philippines, do not generally engage in 
criminal prosecutions, have never done so, or do so 
through administrative channels. Third, appellants rely 
heavily on the fact that Canada has a similar criminal 
antitrust law, has engaged in criminal antitrust 
prosecutions, has an MLAT in effect with the United States, 
has helped in a course of evidence gathering, and has made 
a contact with one of their counsel, to show that they face 
a real and substantial fear of prosecution. However, an 
assertion that a prosecution may be possible, or the fact 
that foreign investigative authorities have engaged in 
inquiries, does not mandate a finding under Flanagan that 
appellants face an existing or prospective prosecution. See 
In re Grand Jury (Chevrier), 748 F.2d 100, 103-106 (2d Cir. 
1984) (no evidence of current, pending investigation, only 
routine inquiry by Canadian government, and lack of 
potential named violations, so no real and substantial fear 
of prosecution); In re Grand Jury (Gilboe), 699 F.2d 71, 76- 
77 (2d Cir. 1983) (no present or prospective foreign 
prosecution, despite asserted claims of "shadowy 
investigations" and newspaper accounts, and no likely 
potential for extradition, so no real and substantial fear of 
prosecution). Therefore, the first and second requirements 
of Flanagan have not been met in this case. 
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As for the fourth Flanagan requirement, appellants claim 
that they could be extradited to Argentina, Canada, Chile, 
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain or Thailand, given 
the existence of treaties with these countries. However, 
Flanagan and related cases demonstrate that the existence 
of an extradition treaty, absent the presence of other 
factors, is not sufficient to create a real and substantial fear 
of prosecution. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury (Gilboe), 699 F.2d 
at 76-77. With respect to the use of their testimony by a 
foreign nation, as touched upon by the third andfifth 
Flanagan factors, we note that, as we discuss more fully 
below, appellants' argument in this regard is speculative at 
best.3 Accordingly, we conclude that appellants have not 
shown a "real and substantial fear" of prosecution. 
 
III. Right to An Evidentiary Hearing 
 
Appellants also claim that their due process rights were 
violated because the District Court refused their requests 
for an evidentiary hearing to question governmental officials 
regarding their contacts with foreign nations. They argue 
that they could have met the "test" under Balsys if they 
could have called governmental officials and questioned 
them, and that the District Court improperly relied on the 
representations of the government in the Schofield affidavits 
in denying such a hearing. In denying their requests, the 
District Court found that the government's statements that 
the witnesses' testimony would not be released was not 
overcome by the evidence adduced by appellants, and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Appellants argue that Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure regarding secrecy of grand jury proceedings gives them little 
comfort in this regard. The Flanagan court recognized that Rule 6(e) does 
not eliminate the risk of a witness's testimony being given to a foreign 
power. As Flanagan noted, grand jury proceedings are not "leakproof," 
and depend in part on the largess of government officials who have 
access to grand jury minutes. 691 F.2d at 123. Here, appellants argued 
that the government had already shared information as a matter of 
course with the Canadian government and its investigators; however, the 
District Court determined that the unsworn allegations of appellants of 
information sharing, in combination with the evidence appellants had 
produced, did not undercut the government's averments of good faith, a 
conclusion that we do not disturb, as we discuss infra. 
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even if their offers of proof were taken at face value, that 
evidence did not point to a set of circumstances that would 
fall within Balsys, and hence, no evidentiary hearing was 
necessary. 
 
Where a witness has challenged a subpoena requiring his 
testimony before a grand jury, we require the government to 
make some preliminary showing by affidavit that: 1) the 
information sought is relevant to the grand jury's 
investigation; 2) properly within the grand jury's 
jurisdiction; and 3) not sought primarily for another 
purpose. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 
F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury (Schofield II), 
507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975). Where the District Court 
is not satisfied with the government's affidavits, either 
because "the matters set forth challenge the court's 
credibility or because the witness has made some colorable 
challenge to the affidavits, the court can require something 
more." 507 F.2d at 964-65. The District Court has broad 
discretion in determining whether further proceedings or 
discovery are necessary or warranted after reviewing a 
Schofield affidavit, including in camera  hearings, additional 
affidavits, or a hearing. See Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 965; 
Schofield I, 486 F.2d at 93. We have also noted that certain 
factors should inform a district court's decision as to 
whether the government is abusing the subpoena process: 
the limited scope of the inquiry into abuse of the subpoena 
process, the potential for delay, and any need for additional 
information that might cast doubt upon the accuracy of the 
government's representations. See In re Grand Jury, No. 98- 
6415, 1999 WL 150880, at *8-*9 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 1999). 
Our review of a decision to deny additional review is 
deferential, and we will not disturb a District Court's 
decision unless its "weighing" was an abuse of discretion. 
See id. at *9. 
 
Appellants argue that the denial of a full evidentiary 
hearing by the District Court was a denial of due process, 
and in so arguing rely on statements that where an alleged 
contemnor faces incarceration, due process requires an 
"uninhibited adversary hearing" where the witness can 
probe "all nonfrivolous defenses to the contempt charge." 
See In re Grand Jury, 13 F.3d 459, 461 (1st Cir. 1994), 
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citing In re Grand Jury (Campaigner Publications) , 795 F.2d 
226, 234 (1st Cir. 1986). However, these same courts have 
recognized, as have we, that due process does not require 
a hearing in all instances where a witness faces being 
found in contempt, and we have limited an alleged 
contemnor's right to calling witnesses to those instances 
where there is a genuine factual dispute or where testimony 
is useful to bring to the court's attention relevant evidence 
not already developed on the record. See In re Grand Jury 
Matter (Backiel), 906 F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, 
courts have noted that a District Court's discretion in 
determining what process is due to an alleged contemnor is 
very broad. See 13 F.3d at 461; see also Sanchez v. United 
States, 725 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding order 
with regard to witness's custody on the basis of witness's 
affidavit and oral argument); Simkin v. United States, 715 
F.2d 34, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (witness affidavit only). 
 
As we have recently noted in In re Grand Jury: 
 
       There is a difference between requiring evidentiary 
       support and requiring a hearing. Neither Supreme 
       Court precedent nor our prior decisions require that a 
       hearing be held whenever a subpoena is challenged on 
       reasonableness grounds. Indeed, this court has 
       specifically rejected any such suggestion, leaving the 
       decision to hold a hearing to the district court's 
       discretion. . . . Nor does precedent or policy require a 
       different rule when the challenge is a constitutional 
       one. 
 
1999 WL 150880, at *8 (citations omitted). 
 
In particular, the appellants have argued that alleged 
instances of information sharing between the Antitrust 
Division and Canadian investigators and other instances of 
joint investigative activity involving other countries, as 
outlined above, created genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether the government was sharing information in their 
cases, and whether the instant prosecutions were, in fact, 
joint international prosecutions, and that the District Court 
was therefore in error in denying them an evidentiary 
hearing. In making its ruling on the motions for an 
evidentiary hearing, the court found that neither the 
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witnesses' allegations nor their proffered evidence cast 
sufficient doubt on the government's pronouncements to 
lead the court to conclude that an evidentiary hearing was 
necessary.4 
 
Appellants now assert that their position is unique in 
that all of the evidence they require is in the hands of the 
government, and that the District Court should have 
permitted them to challenge the government's averments of 
good faith by calling and examining witnesses. We find that 
they do not face a situation all that different from any 
individual challenging a grand jury subpoena; we must 
preserve the proper balance between the grand jury's need 
to know and the rights of the witnesses summoned before 
the grand jury, and we have structured our analysis of a 
District Court's decisions in these matters keeping both of 
these interests in mind. See In re Grand Jury , 1999 WL 
150880 at *8-*10; In re Grand Jury Matter (John F. Kennedy 
Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
The District Court was aware of the nature of the inquiry 
before it, the interests at stake, and the manner in which 
the government's Schofield affidavits had been challenged 
by appellants. Appellants presented an array of evidence 
and argumentation, which the court examined at length in 
light of the Schofield affidavits; it determined that there was 
no basis for a hearing whereby appellants could question 
the bona fides of the government statements. Absent a 
genuine factual issue, or some showing of harassment or 
bad faith sufficient to warrant rejection of the Schofield 
affidavits, the District Court exercised its discretion to rely 
upon the affidavits and averments of the government, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court did query government counsel as to whether it would be 
required to seek the Court's leave under Rule 6(e) to disclose testimony 
or proofs compelled from the witnesses to a foreign sovereign. The 
government opined it would be required by law to approach the court for 
a 6(e) order to disclose such materials. The District Court later noted 
that were the government to change its position in this matter regarding 
disclosure of material to foreign authorities, it would apply to the Court 
for a 6(e) order. The District Court allowed that in such a situation it 
would be willing then to revisit the question of an evidentiary hearing 
and the applicability of this case to Balsys, but emphasized that: "We 
are not at that point. We may never be." 
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in so doing, did not violate appellants' due process rights. 
See In re Grand Jury, 1999 WL 150880 at *8-*9; Backiel, 
906 F.2d at 85; 802 F.2d at 102; In re Grand Jury 
(Schmidt), 619 F.2d 1022, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1980). We find 
that the District Court's denial of appellants' request for a 
hearing was not an abuse of discretion in this case. 
 
We will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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